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INDIA’S OPTIONS ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
TEST BAN TREATY
India has reached a criticaJ juncture in relation to the CTBT. Given that the CTBT 
has serious implications for India’s nuclear policy, it is imperative that a thorough 
assessment be undertaken of India’s CTBT options before a choice is made. The 
CTBT has been on the disarmament agenda since the 1950s, with hardly any progress 
until 1993. This lack of movement was almost entirely due to the unwillingness of the 
nuclear weapon powers, especially the U.S., to commit to non-testing. The reason for 
the shift in U.S. thinking after almost four decades is best captured by the statement of 
Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch, who chaired the United Nation’s Ad Hoc 
Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in 1994.
"Whal is occurring now with regard to nuclear testing is not very different from  
what has been happening in the disarmament fie ld  fo r  years; the technologically 
more advanced nations reach a point where they can discard a certain weapon or 
weapon-related activity and then they move to ban that weapon or that activity fo r the 
rest o f the world throttgh a multilateral t r e a t y .That the U.S. behavior is more 
consistent with its self interest rather than with genuine disarmament should come as 
no surprise. The French and Chinese nuclear weapons testing activity even as CTBT 
negotiations are proceeding likewise shows a strong concern with their respective 
national security interests. As such, it is incumbcnt on Indian policymakers to 
formulate India’s CTBT option giving special attention to Indian national interest, both 
immediate and long term.
CTBT OPTIONS OVERVIEW
The specific CTBT options open to India are as follows:
1. Sign the CTBT as is
2. Sign the CTBT after time bound condition is met
3. Sign the CTBT with quid pro quo
4. Reject the CTBT and do not test
5. Test and then sign the CTBT 
6 Reject the CTBT and Test
Each of the above options is taken up in detail in the next section, giving special 
attention to fte following issues and questions.
1. What are the lisks involved for India as well as benefits which mig}it accrue ?
2. What are strategies fodia could utilize to maximize the benefits and minimize the 
risks?
3. What are die implications of each CTBT option on India’s national security 
options?
DISCUSSION OF CTBT OPTIONS
OPTION ONE: Sign the CTBT As Is
The (^tion of signing the CTBT without any conditions would be consistent with 
neidier India’s principle nor self interest. While at first glance, it would appear that it 
would serve India’s long held stand of disarmament, without any commitment from the 
nuclear powers for eliminating nuclear weapons, it would at best amount to inhibiting 
prospects for vertical proliferation. Indeed, signing the CTBT as is would tend to 
peipemate the unequal nuclear order, somethmg which India has opposed in principle 
from the outset of the nuclear age.
Benefits of Potion One
A major benefit that could be expected upon signing the CTBT would be the 
release of pressure on India by other states. Whether fliis will translate into anything 
tangible is doubtful given that existing embargo regimes may remain untouched. India 
could 1^ greater claim to leadership of future disarmament efforts by the developing 
countries once it gets on board the CTBT campaign. Currently, India is in a rather 
isolated position vis-a-vis other Third World countries on nonproliferation. Signing the 
CTBT would tend to strongly re-aflirm India’s commitment to disannament and 
convincingly demonstrate that it has no hidden agenda. There is also the possibility that 
Pakistan’s nuclear development will be restrained under a fiill CTBT regime. In
addition, the nuclear club’s refinement and development of fburtii generation weapons 
may be impeded. In general, the benefits for India are likely to be at the symbolic 
level.
Risks of Option One
If India adopts C ^ o n  One. it will face a  number of risks wdiich could be expected 
to worsen over time without commensurate steps by nuclear weapon states to disarm in 
any meaningfiil way. The countiy’s ability to deal with nuclear armed states will be 
weakened. India will be feced with increasing difficulty in handling China politically 
and militarily, particularly considering the economic dominance it is attempting to 
achieve in Asia. Given China’s substantial military modernisation program which it is 
committed to, Indian investments in conventional defence will have to rise markedly in 
order to m aintain adequate protection against a potential conventional direat. China’s 
assertive military postures, demonstrated for example in the row over the Taiwan 
Straits in March 1996, would pose greater challenges for India.
Under ftis scenario, Pakistan will sign the CTBT as well and on fece value, it 
would seem that its nuclear program is constrained. But India leaves itself exposed to 
possible transfer of nuclear technology and material to Pakistan from other states such 
as China which could be utilized to enhance Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capability. 
Indeed, of the three generally recognised important threshold states v ^ c h  have not 
signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) ~  India, Pakistan and Israel ~  the 
Indian nuclear program will be most hard pressed given that Israel can depend on the 
U.S. to a large extent for transfer of information. Existing verification measures of 
NPT have already proved to be ineffective in combating the danger of clandestine 
weapons capabilities development as revealed by the North Korean and Iraqi cases. 
Such a potential danger would continue even with a CTBT. Thus India m i^ t a td  up 
in a particularly precarious position.
As for the CTBT’s power to constrain the nuclear weapon states’ c^abilities in the 
fiiture, there is much evidence to suggest otherwise. Even as arms control is on the 
rise, U.S. weapon laboratories will remain intact. The next gaieration of directed 
energy w e ^ n s  are those which are generated by nuclear explosirai powered devices
which transform, select or direct their energy in a unique way. Such weapon systems 
research begun in 1985 (two years after Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars speech) will give 
a considerable edge to American military in the future.^ On August 11, 1995, 
President Clinton did concede to a zero yield CTBT despite previous efforts to retain 
the right to test at low threshold levels. At the same time, the President reserved the 
position of maintaining the American nuclear facilities and associated personnel.
President Clinton secured the future of the Department of Energy (DOE)’s three 
nuclear weapons laboratories in October 1995 by proclaiming all three key to 
maintaining reliable nuclear weapons under the current Test Ban Treaty. Clinton took 
this position as the DOE and the U.S. Congress were engaged in a struggle over the 
fate of of government’s 27 laboratories in the ostensibly post-cold war budget cutting 
era. The three weapons laboratories, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia and Los Alamos, 
also escaped the recommendation made earlier by the DOE Commission that all 
nuclear weapons work be consolidated at Sandia.^
In addition, the U.S. position allows for so called subcritical tests. The subcritical 
tests do not achieve a self sustaining chain reaction like nuclear tests but they do 
involve high explosive and fissile material. The content of the fissile material is kept 
sufficiently low so that it does not become critical upon explosion of the surrounding 
chemical explosive. Such an exemption provides a capability to the U.S. for 
refinement of nuclear weapons, which is not open to other less technologically 
advanced states. The U.S. has announced plans to conduct six of these sub*critical 
tests, code named REBOUMD in 1996 and 1997 at the Nevada test site." None of the 
planned tests utijizes a nuclear warhead but the Department of Energy has retained the 
possibility of carrying out “bomb configiualion” tests in the future.’
In a similar fashion, the U.S. would be able to continue a form of nuclear testing 
using computer simulations which are not governed by the current CTBT version and 
once again are not within fte  capacity of others except the U.S. at this point time. 
There is a strong potential that just as the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 wiiich 
prohibited atmospheric testing drove testing underground, the CTBT will drive testing 
into the laboratories by those with the capability to do so. In the cunent CTBT 
negotiations, the U.S. position is that an interpretation that nuclear weapons “critical to 
(our) deterrence could no longer be certified without testing” would permit
withdrawal from the Treaty if the President in consultation witfi the U.S. Congress
reached such a consensus.
If India accepts the CTBT as is, it will be perceived as being a “sofi” state by the 
advanced powers with a strong likelihood that instead of rewarding Indian restraint, 
there will be increased steps to constrain its nuclear and related programs. The CTBT 
would then be the beginning of a series of measures designed to curtail Indian options 
and India could find itself on a hard to reverse slippery slope. Apart from external 
perceptions, this option could negatively affect the morale of the Indian arnted forces.
Strategies to Optimize Option One
It is difficuh to formulate strategies which will maximize benefits and minimize 
costs under this scenario. One move would be to recognise and accept that by signing 
the CTBT as is, India has dramatically changed its traditional policy on meftods to 
achieve its disarmament objectives and as such could sign not just the CTBT, but the 
NPT as well. This way India would be sending a strong message regarding its 
adherence to existing non-proliferation regimes and could reap maximum benefits 
possible.
OPTION TWO: Sign the CTBT After Time Bound Condition is Met
This is * e  option that India has currently put forward at the ongoing Conference 
on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. On January 25, 1996, Indian Ambassador 
Arundhati Ghose stated in the CD’s plenary meeting that “we must be able to start 
negotiations on a time*bound program for the elimination of nuclear weapons.”* India 
is seeking a modification of the language in the preamble to die treaty which would 
incorporate the time bound condition for disarmament. Ambassador Ghose framed 
India’s proposal for a time bound CTBT in the historical context of India’s position on 
the CTBT by noting the tight linkage it has made between non-proliferation and 
comprehensive disarmament. India’s position is that particularly in the aftermath of 
the indefinite extension of NPT in 1995, a CTBT whidi extracts no concrete 
commitmrait from the nuclear w e ^ n  states toward disarmament will amount to a
perpetual discriminatoiy intemationa] system, which is moreover legitimized 1^ diese 
same treaties.
Benefits of Option Two
The benefits of India signing a time bound CTBT are similar to diose for signing 
the CTBT as is. India will be seen to have acted on its long declared principle. 
External pressures India on non-proliferation will most likely ease as a result Most 
importantly, India would have laid the groundwork for holding tiie nuclear powers to a 
“deadline” in moving toward disarmament and tiiereby set an important precedent for 
international negotiations. If this agreement is secured, disarmament <m the part of the 
nuclear powers will be forced to shift from rhetoric to measurable action.
Risks of Option Two
The risks for India under this scoiario are similar to those for Option One. If 
senous negotiations do begin on a time-bound CTBT an issue for India will relate to 
the questitm of how much “time”in the firamework is acceptable. Once such a process 
starts. India vtnll have to guard against securing a meaningless timetable w4iich would 
be a pyhrric victory at best. The nuclear weapon states may be expected to yield on a 
concrete time frame <mly if its horizon is a distant one. Even if tiie weapon powers 
concede a time-bound CTBT, the benefits are more illusory than real since Ae actual 
verification of total disarmament and its implementation will not be piaranteed nor 
easy. While it is possible to monitor the reduction of arms, this task becomes much 
more difficult when the number ostensibly reaches zero weapons. India would have to 
rehnquish its testing option now for a future promise by the nuclear powers, which 
provides wider latitude for the latter. In general, disarmament linkage to ncm- 
proliferation moves has been a non-starter in the past and therefore, India is attempting 
to achieve an objective which prima facie has proven to be unworkable in international 
negotiations so far. India then runs Ihe risk of being perceived as either unrealistic or 
worse, disingenuous and having an unstated hidden agenda
Strategies to Qptiinize OotiOTi Two
&i one soise, Ae utility of Opliai Two seems to lie mostiy in it being an “exit 
strategy.” This strategy is a convenient one if India plans to refuse to sign the CTBT 
all al(xig since there is practically no chance diat tiie nuclear we^XHi states will acc^t 
the time bound condition. Tliis is especially true after fte indefinite extension of the 
NPT unconditionally in 1995 w*ich has shifted the momentum and bargaining power 
decisively to the weapon powers who have litde to fear in terms of <q>positi(HL The 
pendulum appears to have swung substantially away fixMn disarmamait to non­
proliferation within a fairly short period of time.
Strategies associated with Option Two would have to take into account * e  need to 
have credible disarmament implementation yardsticks in order to monitor the actiais of 
weapon powers. O n e  s t r a t e g y  would be to link the CTBT’s entry into force for India 
(and others if agreeable) with specific disarmament progress. Or conversely, India 
could propose revised language such tfiat the time bound CTBT would be signed now, 
but only with the addition of an exit clause in the event disarmament is not proceeding 
witfiin an agreed upon specified time.
OPTION THREE: Sign the CTBT with Quid Pro Quo
TTiis option begins from the assumption that India should not give up its nuclear
t e s t i n g  o p t i o n  w i A o u t  gaining something tangible in retum. Unlike Israel and Pakistan,
India has already tested a nuclear device and therefore, it would be tantamount to 
giving up an option it has already exercised. Indeed, apart from the nuclear weapon 
states, hidia is the only country in this peculiar situation. Hiere are a variety of quid 
pro quo proposals Indian can make relating to both technical and poUtical matters. A 
quid pro quo approach ironically may give rise to a more receptive west which tends to 
comprehend such realpolitik in contrast to principles. Ifrecent American b ^ v io u r  is 
any guide, its interaction with NorA Korea suggests that Ae nuclear issue is quite wide 
opai to bargains being struck. (North Korea is receiving qjproximately $5 billion 
worth of power reactors as a pi^roff for compromising on its nuclear programme).
Benefits of Option Three
One major area of possible benefits is the dismantling of the embargo regimes 
which operate against India. A number of leading edge technologies which are 
classified as dual use are off limits to India. With India’s current liberalization and 
dnve for global competitiveness, access to such technologies is highly desirable.
It should be pointed out that India’s traditional stand of keeping the nuclear option 
and refi âining from the NPT has not been without heavy costs. While a cumulative 
economy wide cost analysis is not available, some of the impacts on the nuclear sector 
can be identified to give a sense of the situation. For example, the global market price 
of natural uranium, the fiiel for nuclear power reactors, has been low and available in 
plenty, but being a non-signatoiy to the NPT, access to this market is denied to India. 
This has resulted in India processing its very poor grade ore at a cost much h i^er than 
what prevails globally and exhausting its limited natural uranium resources.
To discourage France and China from continuing with further nuclear tests, the 
U S. has offered to exchange information on nuclear tests and computer simulation 
data. A claim by India to a similar exchange of information with the U.S. can be marfA 
and will be useful considering the fact that India is the only country that has tested a 
device apart from nuclear weapon states. In addition, in comparison to Pakistan and 
Israel, India cannot depend on transfer of such information from any nuclear power 
patron like the others.
Indigenisation of the type which has been forced on India rather than tî kfn as the 
first preference is also instructive to look at. Development of ciyogenic engines by the 
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is an example. While India has the 
capability to develop any sophisticated equipment, it should not be forgetten that such 
efforts have enormous cost and time impact which is unaffordable.
Apart from technology gains which may be bargained for, a political prize which 
may be extracted is a seat on flie U.N. Security Council complete with veto power if 
possible. The enlargement of the Security Council seems inevitable, especially in the 
context of emerging power shifts in the world away from the western countries which 
occupy most of these seats. It would behoove India to be prominent in the line up for a 
largei- membership.
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Risks of Option Three
A quid pro quo agreement has the drawback that while it requires that India sign 
the CTBT immediately, the nuclear powers have to deliver on their promise only in 
the future. There is a certain asymmetry of obligation in this respect against India. As 
such, there is some risk that the nuclear weapMi states or state may not live up to their 
commitments or honor the quid pro quo agreement once India has signed the Treaty. 
Most importantly, since India remains outside the NPT, its restrictions pertaining to 
nuclear related technology transfers without fiillscope safeguards may be expected to 
pose a difficult problem for boA sides in bargaining towards an acceptable agreement 
of quid pro quo.
Whatever the specific package might turn out to be, one consideration to keep in 
mind is the fact that while it will save costs of “indigenisation” of dual use technology, 
it will also resuh in some reduction of India’s long held goal of self rehance in vital 
sectors. In a related vein, any quid pro quo proposal runs the risk of being 
disproportionate from Indian view poim. Thus it is important to reconcile the question 
of how much the “testing option” is to India so as to avoid possibly
undervaluing it in the bargain being fashioned.
Strategies to Optimi?^ Option Three
If serious quid pro quo negotiations are to take place, it would be in India’s interest 
to hold out the maximum time possible for maximum gains. This is especially so given 
the relatively short time left for completing the CTBT negotiations. India could begin 
with a “wish li.st” which it should be willing to pare down as the bargaining proceeds. 
Any final arrangement should include western milestones which have to be met before 
India ratifies the Treaty. This will safeguard India against the nuclear weapon states 
not delivering on their promises.
OPTION FOUR: Reject the CTBT and Do Not Test
Three variations on this Option may be dififerentiated. TTie first would be to reject 
the CTBT on principle; the second would be to withdraw from the CTBT with stated 
reasons; and the third would be to stay in the Conference on Disarmament until the
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end of the round registering India’s dissatisfaction, contributing to die drafting of 
Trea^ language but opting not to sign tfie CTBT as it stands. It has been put forward 
in some quarters that India should withdraw, from the CD citing “material” c h a n ^  
since the negotiations on the CTBT began in 1993. These include the indefinite 
extaision of the NPT without any disarmament commitments; a breach of the NPT in 
the form of nuclear technology transfer by nuclear weapon states; as well as the letters’ 
argument before the World Court regarding their right to possess and use nuclear 
wesq}ons. Under all three variations, India would continue to retain its nuclear option 
but without exercising its option in the form of nuclear testing or weaponization. As 
such, Option Four amounts to a continuation of the status quo and would irarror India’s 
position on the NPT.
Benefits of Option Four
This option has the benefit of consistency with India’s past declared policies. It 
underlines India’s commitment to constructing non-discriminatoiy international 
regimes and emphasizes its tenacity despite the fi-agmentation of the non-aligned 
movement on this issue. It also shows that while India will not compromise on 
disarmament, it will abide by the principled position of not climbing up the nuclear 
ladder any further than it already has -- hence the decision against testing. In light of its 
threshold status and the generally accepted nuclear we^ons c^ability, tadia will be 
able to maintain its nuclear deterrent image, at least in the form of what has been 
referred to as non-weaponised or recessed deterrence. In defying the intemational 
trend towards signing the CTBT specifically or more generally the American-led non­
proliferation drive since the end of the cold war, India could be perceived as shoring up 
its deterrence with strong symbolic power even without tangible action to follow.
Theoretically at least India would retain its bargaining power for quid pro quo 
negotiations which may be taken up at a later date. Lidia’s political will in not 
conceding to a much trumpeted CTBT is Hkely to demonstrate its resolve in the 
nuclear field and therefore, buy greater currency for its bargaining position in future 
negotiations. One other benefit of this option is that India avoids being subjected to 
intrusive measures which are likely to be applied in a discriminatory fashion.
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Risks of Option Four
Rejecting the CTBT outright at this stage or withdrawing fixim the CD with stated 
reasons or participating in the CD until the end without intent to sign are progressively 
softer versions of the same option. Despite * e  nuances of difference between them, 
any of Aese courses of action could well be perceived as being simply obstructionist. 
Withdrawing msQr be equated with rqection and thus * e  option of “walking out” of the 
negotiations at this stage as a more cooperative gesture may not be viewed with any
greater equanimity by the nuclear weapon powers.
An Indian posture of rejection would likely lead to immediate condemnation and 
raise the ire of the nuclear states. The option of continuing to talk but refusing to sign, 
will bring ill will as well. ITiis negative r e ^ o n  will be multiplied if it is accompanied 
by Indian action to confound a consensus vote under which the CD is operating now. 
India will be perceived as a “spoiler” which may lead to an even more negative image 
of India than if it had just rejected the CTBT or withdrawn before the CD reached the
voting stage.
In terms of fiihire bargaining position, India’s power can be expected to dissipate 
quite dramatically after the CIBT is signed and internationally accepted. Thus the 
potential retention of power for quid pro quo bargaining should not be overestimated. 
Similarly, while not signing the CTBT keeps open India's nuclear weapon option, a 
perception tiiat interminably keeping an option “open” is tantamount to indecision could 
be costly. This detracts from the positive nuclear deterrent image India is trying to 
cultivate at the same time. Moreover, as the international norm against nuclear 
weaponization becomes stronger through measures such as the mdefinitely extended
MPT and CTBT, I n d i a ’ s  position becomes weaker as time passes.
Strateeies to Optimize Option Four
A strategy of dual track diplomacy by which India maintams its deterrent posture, 
but also participates in the non-proliferation dialogue at the CD in good faith might 
alleviate the repercussions of rejection of the CTBT Staying m the CD allows the 
opportunity for Lidia to make its position heard and quite possibly even appreciated.
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This would avoid the perception of btdia as a challenger to the formation of new non­
proliferation regimes.
If the option of withdrawing from the CTBT negotiations is taken, it needs to be 
staged with care and without acrimony. Rather than effecting a precipitous political 
break, it should be done within the framework of legal principles thereby sofretiing the 
character of India’s action as well as probable external reactions. India could point to 
so-called “material changes” in the international situation justifying a shifr in India's 
pastpro-CTBT stand. These include the indefinite extension of the NPT and its lack 
of disarmament teeth; the nuclear powers’ argument regarding the right to use of 
nuclear weapons before the International Court of Justice; and an ostensible breach of 
the NPT by a nuclear weapon signatoiy. This last point referring to China’s co­
operation with Pakistan in providing ring magnets is particularly relevant for Indian 
security. With the attendant lack of response by the other nuclear weapon states, it 
could be argued that circumstances are forcing India to take this unilateral step of 
withdrawing from the CD in the interest of its national security.
A stronger strategy on India’s part would be to hold out the threat of conducting 
further nuclear tests in order to extract concessions or hammer out a quid pro quo 
agreement. This would be premised on the assumption that opting out of the CTBT 
is bound to create tensions witii the nuclear powers anyway, and thus it would be 
sensible to go one step further and up the ante. Otherwise, simply staying out of the 
process without exercising its testing option, may mitigate negative effects only 
marginally.
OPTION FIVE: Test and Then Sign the CTBT
The option of conducting one or more nuclear tests with the accompanying proviso 
that the CTBT will be signed and adhered to subsequently, attempts to respond to both 
principle and pragmatism. On the face of it, it might seem that Option Four which 
envisages India abstaining from the CTBT preserves greater freedom of action for 
India, but one critical question to consider is whether India will have the political will 
to actually cany out any stronger measures once a CTBT comes into force 
intemationally, even though the country theoretically has reserved the right to do so. If
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India has refrained from testing in a world without CTBT, it would be well worth 
considering how much more difficulty there would be to test in a world with CTBT. 
Of all the options considered in this report. Option Five and Six are likely to bring 
about the greatest costs in the immediate term in light of international reaction. One 
issue to keep in mind in this connection is the tradeoff to be made between short term 
costs versus probable long term benefits.
Benefits of Option Five
It may be assumed that nuclear testing as such has deterrence value, even widiout 
the development of nuclear weapons. Testing by India can be expected to increase 
strategic credibility which is the cornerstone of deterrence thinkmg. It is not clear w4iat 
India has lost or gained with its restraint of not testing for 22 years in terms of its 
strategic image. Testing is bound to give a refurbished image for India. Testing 
provides deterrence value in two ways: it increases the country s techmcal proficiency 
and reliability; and it demonstrates resolve and political will. Thus deterrence is 
boosted at both political and technical levels.
This option would send a message to the U.S. and ofters of concern that external 
pressure will not work anymore. At the same time, it promotes a pro-active perception 
of India and removes a perception of India as being obstructionist and “preachy 
without any teeth. It should also give rise to a certain grudging respect for India. In 
addition, it would begin to correct certain existing asymmetries against India In Indo- 
U.S. relations, there has been no commensurate rewards for Indian testraint in testing 
and weaponization for 22 years, and rather has left India with the costs of technology 
denials and pressures against missile development. In tfie group of countries including 
India, Israel and Pakistan,arguably it is only India vrfiich requires its own testing for 
information given the relationship of the latter two to the U.S. and China respectively. 
This option would also correct an unstated bias against India vis-i-vis these other two 
countries. Israel and Pakistan have never tested a nuclear device (at least openly and 
on the record) so they would be pursuing a status quo condition wiA the CIBT 
whereas India has already crossed the testing line and would have to accept a status 
quo ante. Thus in one sense, India is being asked to forgo more than the others.
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Another possible benefit of Option Five is that an Indian test would either call 
Pakistan's “bluff’ or confirm its capability since it has declared that it would follow 
suit. Since there is genuine conflict of opinion regarding the exact nature of Pakistan’s 
nuclear capability in this country, a positive side effect for India would be gaining 
greater information regarding its neighbour.
Risks of Option Five
Implementing Option Five would heavily damage India’s traditionally held principle 
of abjuring the nuclear route. But if coupled with a strong commitment to adhere to the 
CTBT, it should mitigate India’s seemingly inconsistent behaviour. This should also 
soften external pressures or sanctions since it would become more important tiian ever 
for the proponents of CTBT to get India on board. It would be disastrous from their 
point of view to have the most important threshold state test and then become so 
isolated that it amounts to flagrant flouting of the CTBT just as the Treaty is getting 
off the ground. But India will no doubt at minimum feel fte pain of diplomatic and 
political isolation. It is also quite likely that it will face sanctions from key intemational 
players and given the importance of such action, it is worth discussing such 
repercussions at some length.
Sanctions on India may be bilateral or multilateral. If we ccmsider the role of the 
most important player, the U.S. it is possible to gain some in s is t into its potraitial 
reaction by observing its b^aviour in die wake of purported Indian preparations for 
nuclear testing in late 1995. According to the U.S. State D^artment, a 1994 law 
known as the Qenn Amendment requires the U.S. to suspend economic and militaiy 
aid as well as loans and export licenses to any country besides the five declared nuclear 
powers that tests a nuclear weapon. Under this, the U.S. would oppose loans from 
the World Bank and other multilateral lending agencies. Regarding warnings by the 
U.S. to India in 1995, however, flie State Department refused to confirm that the U.S. 
Ambassador to India Frank Wisner had warned India that any nuclear test would in fact 
activate the den n  Amendment.^
Hie impact of any type of outside sancticm depends on the extent of India’s external 
dependence and vulnerabilities. To get a full picture, diis dependaicy has to be 
juxtaposed against Indian strengths vis-a-vis external powers as well.
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Indian Vulnerabilities
There are several areas in which India may suffer if subject to sanctions. These 
include, external aid, external debt, trade balances and vital conunodity imports (e.&. •
oil and fertilizers.) Data for the foUowing discussion n i^  be found m * e  Appendix.
External Aid
The first step of international sanctions is Kkely to be bilateral aid, over which 
each country has the greatest control. F o r  India, the U.S. is the most irnportant. with
Russia and Japan making up the top three donors. (See Table 1 in Ihe Appendix). If 
we take the countries providing substantial aid (for e.g over Rs.lOOO crore), six 
countries fall into this group -  U.S.. Russia. Japan. Germany. France and U.K. m order
of the level of assistance. T o g e * e r  t h e y  provide about 44% of India’s aid. Countries
most likely to follow U.S. cut-off of aid on the nuclear issue are the U.K.. Germany and 
Japan, which would account for one half of aid fiom the k ^  six donors identified
above.U. mos. impomn. single s o u K .  of fcrlndi. is *e  Wortd B«k wUch n»k«
up n»l,54% < ,fto t.lassiM K .. O u t  o f  t e ,  60% of »  "*eiv«l fcm. th«
Woild Bank's soil loan window or th« In»™ilional Development Assoeinnon winch
d i s b u n i e s f i m i s w i t h l i t t l e o r n o i n ^ s t .  H u s b e « « n l h e s i x K » d o n o r  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  
t h e W o , l d B a r i c , I n d i . r e « i v e s « p . o 9 8 % o f i B  a i d  G i v o . t h e « l v a n « « e » » p o s . t » .
of the U S within the Worid Bank's weighted voting st^oure and «s pohncd 
influence, Wotld Bank behavior a®  be expected to mii™ thM of the U.S. It is likely
given past exp«,ence that th eU S , will f i n d  i t  e a s i e r  to block Worid Bank fimdsth». to
coordinate an inletnMional a i d  c » t - < « b y  other donors in their bilateral con»n«ments to 
India,
India's Debt
Another dimension of vulnerability is the Indian debt position. (See Tables 2 
and 3 in the Appendix). If the debt and debt service indicators for fadia and other 
major developing countries are taken into account. India's indicators compare 
favourably with others and show that Didia does not stand out as particularly 
vulnerable, though that in itself is not necessarily re-assuring when sanctions
against
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India alone are considered. India has a relatively higher grant element in its external 
debt implying that the present value of the debt is much lower than the nominal value 
of the debt. This is in sharp contrast to other developing countries for which there is 
very little change in the ratio regardless of whether present value or nominal figures are 
used.
India has a massive debt burden of nearly $ 100 billion. Going by the absolute size 
of India’s debt, the country is the third highest debtor among the developing countries 
with only Brazil and Mexico surpassing it. But experts note that the real cause for 
worry should be the debt service burden (i.e., interest and repayments liability).
India’s debt service payments as a percentage o f exports of goods and services 
improved from 35.25% in 1990-91 to 26.65% in 1994-95, but remains high by 
international standards. One positive feature o f the debt burden is that the 
maturity composition o f the debt portfolio has changed substantially over the last 
few years. Since the 1991 crisis, longer term maturity loans have been encouraged 
and short term ones weeded out. Currently, short term loans are as low as 4.31% 
of the total debt. Short term loans had a peak share o f 10.20% in 1991. This shift 
gives India some relief in repayments which would thereby buy time in case of 
short run sanctions. India’s external debt management has led to a sharp 
deceleration in the rate of growth of debt from 10.5% (excluding the increase in 
debt in U.S. dollar terms due to exchange rate fluctuations) in 1994-95. During 
the first six months of 1995-96, external debt in U.S. dollar terms declined by 
approximately 5% relative to the level in March 1995.
Apart from the value of debt, the debt service ratio has shown secular 
improvement. After registering a decline in the dollar value of exports in 1991-92, 
India has experiraiced an upswing of 3.8% growdi rate in 1993-94, 18.4% in 1994-45 
and 24.2% during April-December of 1995-96. As a result, the coverage of import 
payments dirough export earnings (one measure of autonomy) has improved. The ratio 
of exports to imports which had averaged 52% at the beginning-of the 1980’s and 
slightly over 60% in the latter half of the 1980s, has been averaging nearfy 90% since 
1992-93. However, during 1995-96, there has been an upsurge in imports by 29%, 
though the export-import ratio is expected to be dose to 85%. Favourable trends in
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invisible transactions have contributed to India’s current account deficit in tfie balance 
of payments declining from an unsustainable peak of 3.2% of GDP in 1990-91 to a 
projected 1.5% of GDP in 1995-96 year.*
India’s foreign currency reserves which faced a crisis in 1991, with an equivalent of 
hardly a fortnight’s expenditure on imports have substantially increased. By January 
31, 1996 reserves stood at US $16 billion equivalent to approximately five montfis of 
import coverage. This is a critical fector in assessing India’s ability to withstand 
external sanctions. It should be noted however that at the end of December 1995, all 
the major developing countries, barring Indonesia with a foreign exchange reserve of 
US $ 13.3 billion, were holding far greater reserves than India
Polenlial Indian Stremths
The post 1991 liberalization move is having two rather contradictoiy results in terms 
of external vulnerabihty -  on the one hand, increasing integration into fte global 
trading and financial system makes India more vulnerable to shocks to its balance of 
payments and debt position. On the other hand, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
provides India with some bargaining power as a counterbalance. Those foreign 
companies which are doing business in India or are contemplating such, may be 
counted on to act as a lobby for India in fteir respective countries. Transnational 
corporations tend to be among the most well heeled and politically influential of the 
domestic interest groups, especially in flie U.S. Since fliey taid  to be large 
conglomerates and concentrated in number, their interest in keeping an open and 
sanction free intprpnti»nal economic order tends to be reflected in U.S. government 
policy, vAether under Democratic or RepubUcan regimes. Most recently, this has 
become abundantly clear in the intervention of American businesses against 
withholding most favoured nation trade status for China which is being considered by 
the Clinton administration. Host countries for foreign direct investors tend to increase 
their leverage over die MNCs in proportion to tiie commitment of tiie latter s resources 
into the country, especially if it is in the form of plant and equipment (immovable 
property). Once the MNC is established in this way, a very high priority is to maintain 
a reliable and stable politico-economic relationship with the host country in which the 
fimds are tied up.
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FDI doubled from US S 620 miUim in 1993-94 to US S 1.31 biOian in 1994-95. 
During April-November 1995, it grew by 110% over the corresponding period in 
1994-95. The Indian govenunent’s declared policy is to allow FDI most^ in p r io ^  
areas like power, oil refining, electronics and electrtniic equipmoits, rJi«»inimtg 
telecommunicatirais, industrial machineiy and food processing. Many of are 
e;q)ected to have export linkages. Of extonal investors, non-residmt Indian (NRQ 
conq}rises the largest block of funds so a qipioved by die Govenunent of 
Among individual countries, the U.S. remains the largest investor by &r. (See Table 4 
in the Appoidix).
The U.S. accounted for 34.2% o f the total top 14 investors (i.e. with Rs. 10,000 
million or more) or 36.5% when NRI investment is ^eluded. Current evidence 
suggests that the critical role o f the U.S. will continue. Some o f the biggest 
western corporations have aheady set up base in India.
The following table ̂ ves a sense of who these corporations are and what their 
areas of business are.
TABLE 5 - MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES IN INDIA
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Despite negative publicity India received over the Kentucky Fried Chicken and 
Enron episodes, foreign investment continued to flow in. From the foreign 
investors’ point of view, both cases had reasonably satisfactory endings. Enron’s 
power project was renegotiated after the company agreed to reduce costs from 2.8 
billion dollars to 2.5 billion and is now back on stream. In the other case, an 
Indian High Court ordered the re-opening o f the KFC restaurant, and Pepsi Foods, 
KFC’s parent company, is going ahead with its plans to invest $ I million in Indian 
soft drinks and foods over the next five years. In fact, these controversies have 
demonstrated that foreign investors have legal recourse against arbitrary political 
action, something not available for example in a competitor for FDI, China. It is 
believed that once India publishes clear rules for FDI in infrastructure (which it has 
not yet done), the money will come easily.’
The importance accorded to India by the U.S. may be gleaned from the feet 
that since the late U.S. Commerce Secretary, Ron Brown visited India in January 
1995, nearly 7 billion dollars worth of contracts and memoranda o f understanding 
reached during his visit have been realized until now. Recently, Assistant Secretary 
o f Commerce, Raymond Vickery, Jr. testified before the U.S. Congress that the 
deals struck during the visit were “a record of any presidential business mission 
and indicative o f the enormous potential of the Indian market.” He stated that the 
mission was part o f a broader effort to begin a dialogue providing “new 
momentum to building commercial ties, addressing impediments to trade and 
investment, and paving the way for job creating opportunities in the United 
States.”"’ Toward this end, the U.S.-India Commercial Alliance was established.
As a point of FDI comparison, it can be noted that the flow o f external capital 
to China remains massive compared to India. For every $1 million of FDI inflow 
to India, China received $94.5 million (1993 figures) This is in large part due to 
the fact that China has no restrictions on export oriented investment, especially in 
“special economic zones.”"  This also attests to the tremendous appetite of foreign 
investors and that they most likely view current FDI in India as only the tip of the 
iceberg. Under such conditions, there is a low likelihood that the U.S. 
government would precipitate action against India which would hurt its business
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interests in the medium to long term. At the most, it would countenance such for 
the very short run. Thus the presence o f MNCs in India in a big way since 1991 
and the lure o f future prospects for them should give India a certain amount o f 
confidence when contemplating any sort o f bold action on the nuclear front.
Strategies to Maximise Option Five
If this Option is taken, the main objective will be to mute the inevitable 
negative reaction fi-om outside. Given the critical role o f the U.S., it is most 
important to focus attention on Indo-U.S. relations. In opting to test, proper 
groundwork has to be laid regarding its timing, sequence and nature o f test. 
Chances are practically zero that India could carry out a clandestine test and 
thefore, like the established nuclear powers, it could simply announce its intention 
to engage in testing (as close to actual testing date as possible). India could first 
announce a series o f tests greater than what is required or desirable and then as 
external pressure mounts, unilaterally reduce the number. This would follow the 
classic example set by France to mitigate pressure.
Timing could also be played to India’s advantage by testing during a “window 
of opportunity.” For example, if it is assumed that the U.S. does not want to 
alienate two giant Asian markets simultaneously, India could act when the U.S. is 
already pre-occupied with China. Two examples o f such “windows” would be the 
March 1996 Taiwan straits crisis and the June 1996 debate in the U.S. over MFN 
status for China.
India would have to decide what kind o f test best serves its security interests. 
Additional fission bomb testing without it being designed with the ultimate purpose 
o f coupling with a thermo-nuclear part will bring only marginal political, technical 
and strategic advantage. Testing o f a hydrogen device would provide much 
greater advantage in all aspects. A limited numbr o f tests o f these types would be 
in keeping with India’s past penchant for “technology demonstrators.”
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Moreover, a few tests in conjunction with the offer to sign the CTBT would more 
quickly close off opportunity for concerted external reaction. India could buy 
time by signing the CTBT but not ratifying the Treaty until the Indian testing is 
deemed complete. This would follow the Chinese example.
Indeed, the China-U.S. relations offer a model that India can emulate to its 
advantage, now or later. China has ensured that the cost o f sanctions by the U.S. 
is a two-way street not to be borne only by China. This is analogous to the adage 
regarding a debtor country/creditor country relationship which says that if a 
country owes international banks $10 billion and defaults, the country is in trouble, 
but if a country owes $100 billion and defaults, the banks are in trouble. (Apart 
from its analogy here, India can take some comfort from its actual high level of 
external debt under this logic).
China has also successfully divided and played off industrial powers against 
each other with strong economic and military incentive packages such that the 
Chinese can rest assured that coordinated sanctions against it are highly unlikely. 
The April 1996 trip to France by Chinese premier Li Peng and the ensuing drama 
over human rights admonitions versus correct political behavior on the part of the 
French hosts holds a valuable lesson for India on diplomacy. The Chinese refused 
to attend the Prime Minister’s banquent unless offending references to China’s 
human rights record were removed from his speech and in turn got what they 
wanted. In doing so, China has made it clear that they will not tolerate, being 
chastised by those who want to benefit from the Chinese market. As the U.S. 
considers whether to sanction China over clandestine nuclear technology transfer, 
China is signing an agreement with France to buy $1.5 billion worth of airbus A- 
320 aircraft This is a warning that China will distribute its favors on the basis o f 
reciprocity, not merely in the economic sphere, but as quid pro quo for political 
and strategic objectives. Moreover, the Chinese announced their intention to buy 
Boeing aircraft worth $2 billion while in the middle o f arguments with the U.S. on 
human and intellectual property rights. In the process, they obtained the influential 
Boeing Company as a lobbyist for them.
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In Indo-U.S relations, rather than looking at the aggregate numbers relating to 
trade and investment which are not high by international standards, foreign policy 
should be to target large and important American economic players and/or specific 
economic sectors and bring them into a position which is eflFectively one of 
“strategic alliance” with India. Especially in an election year such as this one. 
President Clinton cannot afford to exact a domestic cost for his foreign security 
policy. American polls in the post-cold war period show that international security 
matters have receded dramatically in importance, with the number one concern 
becoming the domestic economy and jobs.
Should India choose Option Five, Clinton is likely to come under pressure 
fi-om the U.S. Congress to act against India, in large part for political partisan 
reasons. In preparing to counteract that pressure, India needs to tap into the way 
American domestic politics is played. An “iron triangle” model o f politics operates 
for Congress wherein Congressional members occupying key committee 
chairmanships are allied with powerful lobby groups who in turn represent 
particular industrial sectors. If the concerned Senators and Representatives 
happen to be from important states then the importance o f this nexus is multiplied.
A strategy with high payoffs would be to identify so-called iron triangles which 
satisfy the following conditions and then to provide incentives for them to be 
supportive of India;
- powerful coporate lobby
- industry location in key states (i.e. large population and high number of 
electoral college members who actually elect the American President)
- allied with important Senators and Representatives
Two sectors which meet all these conditions in the U.S. are the defence 
industry (California based) and the power industry (Texas based). Selfconsciously 
creating linkages through diversifying India’s arms purchases and attracting FDI in 
the power sector respectively could be a strategy to be utilised. Even the 
prospects of future profits for these sectors should give pause for severe sanctions.
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As such, India could with great fan&re host a high level meeting-between an Indian 
delegation and American defense companies, which are in particularly dire straits 
since the decline of the U.S.-Russian arms race. Many frontline weapons in 
American companies now remain open for business only to export abroad. 
Examples include F-15 and F-16 aircraft, Apache attack helicopter and M-IA2 
tanks. The bottom line would be the creation of an Indian incentive package, 
perhaps as part of broader liberalisation efforts, which would be hard to resist.
Of course, the most straightforward strategy for India would be to simply 
absorb the pain o f sanctions. This again would require a great deal of political will 
on the part of Indian leadership. One factor favouring this is that according to 
public opinion polls in India, a majority seem to be in favor of testing and even 
exercising India’s nuclear option, even if it means strong retaliation. This sense of 
nationalism may be expected to tide over the short run costs without political 
effects on the ruling party. If anything, political effects should be positive.
OPTION SIX: Reject the CTBT and Test
This is one of the strongest steps that India can take at this juncture and the one 
with the most serious repercussions. This Option can be taken one step further 
with India declaring itself a nuclear weapon state along with the testing The logic 
for this is that since a non-CTBT posture and testing is likely to bring enormous 
costs, it may make sense to suffer the marginal additional costs and use the 
opportunity to exercise the nuclear option A benefit of this Option is that India 
avoids intrusive measures which are likely to be discriminatory.
Option Six shares many similarities with Option Five in terms of risks as well 
as the type of strategies for India to employ and thus merits only a briet discussion 
In terms of additional strategies, India could launch a public relations compaign 
emphasizing its democratic tradition in an effort to forestall any attempt at labelling 
it a “rogue” state.
Option Six with weaponization could bring a number of benefits over and 
above what may gained from testing alone. First o f all, it would enhance strategic
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credibility against China while the deterrent effect of tests alone are not entirely 
clear India would gain entry into the nuclear club at least de facto, if not de jure 
in the short run. No country has become a nuclear declared state after the oflScial 
cutoff year of 1967 for nuclear weapon status, but one mitigating factor for India 
is that it remains the only one to test a nuclear device openly after 1967. As such, 
it has already crossed the line and broken the code of conduct once in 1974 
without unsustainable repercussions. As a weaponised country, India could 
engage China in nuclear arms talks which could be critical to India’s security. At 
the moment, China is willing to discuss its own nuclear weapons only with other 
nuclear weapon states. In terms o f defence costs, nuclear weapons based security 
could be less expensive than conventional arms.
Finally at the symbolic level, India would no longer be seen by many as having 
a hypocritical or sanctimonious and holier than thou attitude about disarmament. 
Such an external perception of India is fueled by India’s 1974 test, stockpile of 
fissile material, its missile development and the long held nuclear option.
CTBT OPTIONS AND INDIA’S FUTURE SECURITY OPTIONS
A key disjuncture between Indian security perceptions and external 
perceptions of India’s strategic situation has been the tendency of others to draw 
the security perimeter in Indo-Pakistani terms and for India to draw it wider to 
include China. Yet if one looks at Indian behavior, it would not be surprising to 
come to the externally held conclusion given the pre-occupation with Pakistan and 
the deployment o f Indian military power. The CTBT may be seen as a sOrt o f 
litmus test for India in that the type o f option selected will send a strong signal 
regarding both its threat perceptions and intended security preparedness in the 
future.
In thinking about India’s security vis-a-vis China, it is instructive to 
consider U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry’s ‘Tirst Annual Report to the 
President and Congress” in March 1995. In it, he listed three rationales for 
continuing to hold nuclear weapons:
1. Uncertainty regarding Russia ■
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2 Potentially hostile countries could obtain long range delivery 
capability of nuclear weapons.
3. China’s growth in military and economic terms in the next decade
The third reason was a new one which his predecessor had not cited. This 
increasing concern is related to the fact that within the next ten years, China will be 
a formidable power Indian relations with China have been clearly on the upswing. 
However, one important question for Indian defence planners is whether to chart 
India’s iuture long term security based on the intentions or capabilities of potential 
adversaries.
Note: This Report is based on the views expressed by the experts who
participated in a Workshop held at NIAS and does not necessarily reflect the views 
of NIAS. NIAS acknowledges with thanks the support received from the 
Rockefeller Foundation for the International and Strategic Studies Program.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1 • EXTERNAL AID TO INDIA AS ON MARCH 1994
(Rs. in Crores)
Sl.No Source Commitment up to 3 i .3.94 at IMF Rate
I ID A 15916.05
2 World Bank 10238.03
3 I.F.A.D 200.18






























34 E.E.C ( S A C ) 54.60
35 Asian Development Bank 2319.28
36 Australia 9.82
37 Spain 34.50
38 Russian Federation 2972.54
___
Total 48154.50
Source: Ministry ofFinance, Government of India
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TABLE 2 - EXTERNAL DEBT AND DEBT INDICATORS. 1993 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
(\US S BilUon
Country Total EDT PV PV/ PV/ TDS/
(EDT) /GNP of Debt GNP XGS XGS EDT
(%) US $ Bn. (%) (%) (%) (%)
India 92.68 36.3 60.52 24.6 183.0 25.1 46.7
Argentina 74.47 29.6 72.08 28.6 431.9 47.6 0.7
Brazil 132.75 24.0 130.08 23.5 295.8 24.4 1.9
China 83.80 21.4 76.59 19.6 81.3 10.7 16.1
Indonesia 89.50 65.9 81.50 60.0 199.7 32.7 27.9
S.Korea 47.20 144 45.86 14.0 46.2 9.2 10.0
Malaysia 23.34 37.8 22.70 36.7 42.6 7.9 12.3
Mexico 118.03 35.5 116.46 35.0 182.1 32.7 1.2
Philippines 35.27 63.7 33.23 60.0 173.0 24.9 29.5
Thailand 45.82 37.7 44.70 36.7 91.0 18.6 13.0
Turkey 67.86 55.3 63.74 52.0 209.9 28.3 10.3
EDT = External Debt Toal TDS
PV = Present Value o f Debt XGS
Total Debt Service Payments 
Export o f Goods and Services
TABLE 3 - DEBT SERVICE PAYMENT
(USSMiUion)
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95
1 Extemal AssisUince 2214 2315 2447 2541 3024 3202
Repayments 1193 1187 1329 1443 1618 1817
Interest payments 1021 1128 1118 1098 1406 1385
2 External Commercial
borrowinR 2244 3514 2830 2707 3232 4273
Repa>Tfients 1158 2004 1677 1525 1978 2795
Interest payments 1086 1410 1153 1182 1254 1478
3 IMF 1043 778 697 614 387 1368
Repayments 874 644 459 335 134 1146
Interest payments 169 134 238 279 253 222
4 NRI Deposits
Interest payments 936 1282 1036 918 905 1045
S Rupee Debt
Service 983 1193 1240 878 745 1050
Total Debt service 7420 8982 8250 7658 8293 10938
Repayments 4208 5028 4705 4131 4475 6808
Interest payments 3122 3954 3545 3477 3818 4130
As percent of
current receipts 30.90 35.25 30.21 28.63 25.07 26.65
Source; Compiled from data provided in World Debt Tables, 1994-95, 
The World Bank.
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TABLE 4 -  MAJOR FORHGN DIRECT INVESMENT APPROVED BY INDIA. 1991-1995
Source 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total 
1991-1995
NRI 197.0 4391.3 10433.2 4908.8 6922.7 26853.0
U.S.A 1858.5 12315.0 34618.5 34880.9 63430.7 147103.9
Israel 12.7 14.6 85.2 41295.6 41408.1
U.K. 321.0 1176.7 6227.3 12991.5 17090.1 37806.6
Japan 527.1 6102.3 2574.3 4009.0 14992.5 28205.2
Mauritius - - 1242.4 5347.4 17545.4 24135.2
Thailand - 25.2 3684.2 99.8 19680.9 23490.1
Gennany 418.0 862.7 1759.3 5693.6 12087.1 20820.7
Netherlands 559.2 967.9 3216.5 2069.6 9471.7 16284.9
Switzerland 355.0 6897.6 4268.0 483.0 2050.0 14053.6
Italy 178.1 893.9 1173.5 3909.4 4144.2 10299.1
Singapur 13.7 602.1 667.4 2655.0 9556.2 13494.4
Australia 26.1 776.2 295.6 3884.5 7661.6 12644.0
Malaysia 1.8 744.3 84.8 252.2 11440.6 12523.7
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